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Abstract
Satellite solar power (SSP) has been suggested as an alternative to terrestrial energy resources for
electricity generation. In this study, we consider the market for electricity from the present to 2020,
roughly the year when many experts expect SSP to be technically achievable. We identify several key
challenges for SSP in competing with conventional electricity generation in developed and
developing countries, discuss the role of market and economic analysis as technical development of
SSP continues during the coming years, and suggest future research directions to improve
understanding of the potential economic viability of SSP.
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Executive Summary
Satellite solar power (SSP) has been suggested as an alternative to terrestrial energy resources for
electricity generation. In this study, we consider the market for electricity from the present to 2020,
roughly the year when many experts expect SSP to be technically achievable. We identify several key
challenges for SSP in competing with conventional electricity generation in both developed and
developing countries, discuss the role of market and economic analysis as technical development of
SSP continues during the coming years, and suggest future research directions to improve the
understanding of the potential economic viability of SSP.
We find that several trends from the present to 2020 should influence decisions about the design,
development, financing, and operation of SSP. One important caveat associated with our observations
concerns the challenge of looking ahead two decades. We base our observations on what we believe
to be plausible estimates of several key indicators derived from the work of respected national and
international research groups, the information and perspectives shared by the experts we consulted for
the study, and our own judgment. Although we believe this information is a valid basis for
considering the competitive environment for SSP, we urge readers to appreciate the pragmatic
process and somewhat intuitive elements involved in its estimation.
Our first set of observations concerns the market for electricity, particularly the key attributes of this
market that are most relevant to investment in SSP:
•  Current trends indicate increasing global demand for energy in general, and electricity in
particular, during the period 2000–20. Electricity demand growth rates will vary
significantly by region of the world and by stage of economic development. The highest
growth will be in developing economies.
•  Deregulation of electricity internationally will strengthen the trend toward decentralized,
private ownership and management of utilities in most countries (developed and
developing)—a major departure from the tradition of nationalized utilities.
•  Nevertheless, the investment in and the operation of conventional electricity markets in
developing economies likely will continue to be or will be perceived to be as risky as
previously because of capital constraints, infrastructure limitations, and institutional and
environmental factors.
•  Constant-dollar electricity generation costs in 2020 likely will be no higher than
prevailing recent levels and very probably will be significantly lower.
•  The monetary value of environmental externalities in electricity generation appears to be
significantly less than some studies have indicated.
•  Global climate change is not presently a major factor in power investment decisions in
developing countries. Willingness to pay for “clean” technologies tends to rise with
increasing incomes, but in developing countries, clean energy may not rank highest
among health and environmental concerns.vii
•  Resource constraints on fossil fuels are unlikely to be a factor in this time frame, other
than possible short-term supply disruptions caused by political and economic factors.
Taken together, these observations suggest that conventional electricity generation in both developed
and developing countries may be more than adequate in terms of cost, supply, and environmental
factors.
Our second set of observations pertains specifically to challenges facing SSP:
•  The relative immaturity of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess
the validity of estimated costs and the likely competitiveness of SSP. For this reason, as
in many space development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reductions in the costs of
space launch and deployment and other key technologies are critical. As these reductions
occur, the economic viability of SSP may become more promising. Until then, it is
premature for the U.S. government to make commitments such as loan guarantees or tax
incentives specifically for SSP.
•  State-of-the-art conventional power-generation technologies increasingly incorporate
numerous environmental controls, eroding somewhat the environmental advantage of
alternatives to fossil fuel technologies, such as SSP.
•  Actual and/or perceived health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic
fields generated by SSP are likely to be of significant public concern.
•  National security and national economic considerations may discourage some countries
from participating in an SSP system operated by another country or group of countries.
Countries with these concerns may require equity participation in SSP, limit their reliance
on SSP to only a small share of their energy portfolio, or decline use of the technology
altogether.
These findings argue for the merits of pursuing research and development in technologies required
not only for SSP but also for other space activities, and for special consideration of issues that
transcend the technical design of SSP, such as health and national security concerns.
We also urge economic study to continue hand-in-hand with SSP technical design. During the course
of our study, we shared our interim findings with the engineering teams working on SSP. All parties
agreed that this interchange of ideas was mutually beneficial and contributed markedly to deepening
our collective understanding of next steps for both the technical team’s engineering studies and our
economic analysis. The two must proceed in tandem, we all agreed, and specific recommendations for
further economic and market studies include the following:
•  The energy industry should be invited to be “at the table” in technical and economic
analysis of SSP—that is, to both participate in conducting the analysis and learn about the
results. The electric utility industry may be particularly interested in helping to guide the
development of SSP technical components that also can be applied in other terrestrial
commercial power markets (for example, the development of solar cells).
•  Modeling of the economics of SSP should explicitly incorporate analyses of risk and
uncertainty, include marketplace data about competition from terrestrial energy markets,viii
and provide a means for structuring an efficient long-term technology development
program that includes industry participation.
•  Continued public funding of SSP for terrestrial power markets must consider the relative
return on taxpayer investment in SSP compared with other technologies in general, and
energy technologies in particular (for instance, photovoltaics). It should be noted that
some past projections of large market penetration of new power-generation technologies
(for example, nuclear and solar) have not been borne out by actual experience.
Finally, we identified specific topics for future research:
•  Our focus in this report is on the use of SSP in terrestrial markets. SSP capabilities may
be applicable to nonterrestrial systems, such as the International Space Station, other
large orbiting platforms, lunar bases, and other activities that are used to explore and
develop space. The benefits and costs of these opportunities should be investigated in the
course of future SSP analyses.
•  Real and perceived safety, health, and environmental risks associated with SSP in its
terrestrial and nonterrestrial power markets should be assessed and discussed in public
forums that engage both scientists and the public.1
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Satellite solar power (SSP) is a means of collecting energy from the sun and transmitting it to Earth to
provide electricity. An SSP system includes an orbiting platform, which gathers solar energy; a
transmission system to send the energy to Earth; and a receiving antenna on the ground to collect the
energy and convert it to a form usable by electric utility grids (see Figure 1). SSP has been suggested
as an alternative to fossil fuels and nuclear fuels for electricity generation and also has advantages
over terrestrial solar power because the satellite system can be continuously exposed to intense
sunlight.1
The original concept for SSP was described more than thirty years ago by Dr. Peter Glaser of the
consulting firm Arthur D. Little, Inc.2 A decade later, the U.S. Department of Energy studied SSP and
developed what became known as the 1979 Solar Power Satellite (SPS) Reference System. Although
it was deemed technically feasible, the system assumed a very costly means of SSP deployment and
operation (for example, a dedicated launch service infrastructure). As a result, most research on SSP
by the U.S. government was halted by 1981. Since then, independent researchers have questioned the
technical and economic assumptions of the 1979 SPS Reference System. They have proposed
alternative development, construction, and operation scenarios that significantly reduce the costs and
timeline for SSP deployment. Most recently, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) 1995–96 Fresh Look Study identified several alternatives.3 These alternatives include
various system designs and orbital arrangements, some of which envision power delivery to locations
in space as well as on Earth.
Economically viable SSP systems have not yet been developed, but advocates believe they someday
could serve both industrialized nations and developing nations as a source of electricity. At present,
the high risk, high cost, and long time horizon of SSP development and commercialization discourage
private companies from mounting their own efforts to be first to market with this unconventional
power source. Indeed, the view twenty to thirty years hence—when SSP is projected to be
operating—is clouded by uncertainties. These uncertainties include future demand for and
competition in conventional and alternative energy production; the extent to which environmental
concerns associated with fossil fuel combustion may favorably influence decisions about solar-based
technologies; and general perceptions of SSP that run the gamut from an individual’s concern about
the health and safety effects of its electromagnetic field to, perhaps, a nation’s concern about whether
                                                     
1 See Mankins 1998 for an introduction to and general discussion of SSP.
2 Glaser 1968; a later study is by Econ, Inc. 1977.
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SSP could be a reliable and secure source of energy. In addition, of course, and aside from these
market-related factors, the construction and operation of SSP itself require tremendous technological
achievements, such as much cheaper access to orbit and progress in robotic assembly and
maintenance of structures in space.
In 1998, NASA commissioned this report—an assessment of the economics of SSP as a source of
electricity in terrestrial markets. Our study attempts to pierce the fog of economic and market
uncertainty for decisionmakers and others interested in the possibilities of SSP in supplying this
market. Our purpose is neither to advocate nor to discourage further investment in SSP but to provide
a framework by which to gauge its economic feasibility if such investment continues. Our framework
might best be thought of as an outline with “placeholders” for information as 2020 approaches. The
data with which we parameterize our thinking in this study represent our best guesses and those of the
experts we consulted. We encourage further peer-reviewed systems modeling of SSP that incorporate
technical design and economic and market information, and we strongly feel that technical planning
should be responsive to the implications of market and economic analyses.
We organize our observations and conclusions into identification of both opportunities and challenges
for SSP in competing with terrestrial electricity generation. In Sections I and II, which constitute the
bulk of our research, we provide a broad perspective on the market environment against which SSP
would need to compete, roughly in the time frame 2015–20. Our primary focus is on long-term
projections of conventional electricity generation, encompassing both the demand for and supply ofResources for the Future Macauley and others
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electricity in industrialized and developing nations. Because SSP may best serve developing
economies, we consider also on the investment climate that may likely characterize these nations in
coming decades.
Also in Sections I and II, we address several related issues. We discuss the likelihood and potential
effects of limits on the supply of conventional fuels (such as oil) on the economics of SSP, and
whether SSP may have advantages over fossil fuels in reducing greenhouse gas emissions or in
serving as an “insurance” premium in providing energy security. In addition, we briefly consider the
health, safety, and environmental issues associated with the technology that may limit its public
acceptance, such as the risk—actual or perceived—that may be associated with the electromagnetic
field in the vicinity of SSP ground stations. Experts with whom we discussed this issue urged that any
such real and perceived safety, health, and environmental risks should be assessed and discussed
further in public forums that engage both scientists and the public as investment in SSP proceeds.
Although our charge was not to model the economics of SSP in significant detail, in Section III we
offer some recommendations on desirable attributes of highly detailed economic models being
developed by other researchers (such as those conducting follow-on studies to the 1996 Fresh Look
analysis). Specifically, we address ways to frame the significant uncertainty associated with not only
markets in the year 2020 but also technological developments required for SSP to bear fruit.
In Section IV, we briefly discuss the roles of government and the private sector in further investment
in SSP. We suggest that decisions about continued public funding consider the relative return of SSP
compared with other energy technologies (such as photovoltaics and fuel cells). We also note that
past projections of large market penetration of new power-generation technologies (for instance,
nuclear and solar power) have not, for various reasons, been borne out by experience. With this in
mind, and given the large uncertainty associated with many of the technological breakthroughs
needed for SSP deployment, we find that it is premature for government to make commitments such
as “anchor tenancy,” loan guarantees, or tax incentives for SSP.
We also underscore the role of the private sector in planning SSP. For example, the electric utility
industry should be invited to be “at the table” in technical and economic analyses—that is, to both
participate in conducting the analysis and learn about the results—particularly because industry may
be interested in helping to guide the development of SSP technical components that also can be
applied in other commercial markets (such as solar cells). In addition, trends toward electricity
deregulation argue for the private sector, not the government, to be the ultimate manager and operator
of SSP, were it to come to fruition, and these trends are likely to have implications for the design of
SSP.
Finally, in Section V, we recognize but do not explore what might emerge as a significant opportunity
for SSP—namely, a source of electricity for space-based activities (such as the International Space
Station and communications and remote sensing satellites). We recommend that future research
consider these applications.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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I. Global Electricity Markets in the Next Twenty Years: The Broad Economic
Setting
In this section, we describe our perspective on the market outlook for terrestrial power in the time
frame 2015–20, the market in which satellite solar power (SSP) would need to compete. Long-term
projections, even of conventional electricity generation—much less of innovative systems—are
inherently uncertain because they are conditioned by a vast number of debatable economic,
technological, and policy assumptions. Our projections are thus best viewed as a road map from
which numerous detours are not only possible but almost inevitable, because changing real-world
developments serve to change one or more assumptions. (Just one of many such possibilities is that
an international regime of severely curtailed carbon dioxide emissions could have major impact on
electricity generated from fossil fuels.)
Nonetheless, we believe that our economic framework constitutes a starting point for weighing the
commercial prospects for SSP. We focus on baseload power, although it is conceivable that SSP
might serve nonbaseload markets. For example, SSP could provide extra power to meet seasonal
demand or backup supply in the event of a power outage (see Box 1). However, we emphasize that
many of the challenges we identify for SSP characterize both baseload and nonbaseload markets.4
Our discussion in this section proceeds along general lines, and we substantiate our conclusions by
more detailed spreadsheet analyses, which are described in the Appendix.
In the following sections, we describe the economic setting for global electricity markets in the next
twenty years, then note methodological and data limitations that hinder the forecasts of these markets.
With these gaps in methods and data in mind, we offer reasoned speculation about projections of
electric capacity and generation as well as generation costs. Our emphasis is on costs, not prices (see
Box 2), because prices can markedly deviate from costs as a result of tax policies, energy subsidies,
and a host of other factors unrelated to costs. In other words, our goal is to enable an “apples to
apples” comparison in estimating the costs of the technologies with which SSP would compete. We
also note in our discussion some specific attributes of developing country energy markets, because
they may be fertile markets for a prospective SSP system (we return to more detailed discussion of
these markets in Section II). In addition, we briefly discuss the resiliency of our projections to
resource constraints (for example, whether we are running out of oil) and to such potentially
significant events as a global economic downturn.
                                                     
4 Baseload power is the power provided by a system that operates essentially continuously and furnishes the
minimum amount of power required by its customer. It is distinguished from peak power, which typically is
provided by low-efficiency, high-cost systems operated only to meet demand in excess of baseload capacity.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Box 1. Other Potential Terrestrial Electricity Markets for SSP
Our analysis of the economic viability of SSP assumes that SSP would compete only with baseload
power. SSP could serve additional markets; however, we doubt that these markets alone would
economically justify the system. As noted in the NASA Fresh Look study (Feingold and others 1997),
an SSP power plant could potentially provide peak load power quickly to several different markets,
for limited periods each day. Other experts have noted that SSP also could offer seasonal sharing of
capacity among regions or provide backup supplies in case of unit outages elsewhere in the local grid
(referred to as “spinning reserve” in the industry).
The flexibility of SSP to serve these additional markets is largely due to two technological attributes.
One attribute is that a disproportionately large percentage of the capital costs of the system is in orbit
rather than in the relatively simple ground system. The second is that the beamed power can be
directed at multiple ground stations at varying power levels, and power levels can be increased from
zero to full power in less than one second.
We note that by the time SSP is deployed, technological innovation in other electricity supplies—for
example, advanced storage systems—might compete with SSP in these markets. Also, increased
construction, operation, and maintenance costs associated with an SSP system that serves multiple
markets (such as the ability to redirect beams) must be considered in estimating the net advantage of
SSP compared with alternative technologies serving these markets.
Box 2. Costs versus Prices
In determining the market situation SSP may face, we focused our study on forecasts of generation
costs. The cost forecasts attempt to predict the expense of electricity generation, not the prices that
final consumers of the electricity will pay.
Costs of electricity generation are the expenses incurred to create electricity. These expenses include
capital and interest payments, operation and maintenance, fuel costs, taxes, depreciation, and a return
on investment.
Prices are the expenses incurred by the users of the electricity. In addition to the generation costs,
they include the expenses related to transmission and distribution, additional taxes, and, in some cases
rate structures designed to discourage or encourage electricity consumption during certain hours of
the day.
Conceptual and Methodological Issues
The ideal conceptual and methodological estimation of future global electricity demand and supply
would incorporate myriad exogenous and endogenous factors: demographic and economic growth, a
comprehensive energy framework that singles out electricity relative to other energy forms,
technological options for generating electricity, and demand-and-supply schedules that determine the
equilibrium cost and price at which transactions will occur. The model would allow for possiblyResources for the Future Macauley and others
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important feedback loops and multidirectional cause-and-effect paths (for example, economic growth
stimulates electricity demand, electrification stimulates economic growth) among these elements.
Such models exist for some individual countries—for example, the U.S. Department of Energy’s
(DOE) National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) for the United States—but even they are still
evolving in terms of their reliability and refinement. To our knowledge, no model that binds
individual country projections together into a consistent global aggregate has ever been constructed in
anything other than perhaps a highly stylized and abstract formulation. For example, in its coverage
of regions that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the International Energy Agency (IEA) “does not explicitly take account of electricity
generation economics.”5
The practical consequence of this gap is that, for the purposes of this study, we present what we
believe to be plausible estimates of several key indicators derived from the work of respected national
and international research groups. Although we believe this information is a valid basis for
considering the competitive environment for SSP, readers need to keep in mind the pragmatic process
and somewhat intuitive elements involved in their estimation. One such caution relates to the fact that
the following text discussion is conducted largely in terms of point estimates of projected indicators.
Obviously, alternative assumptions regarding demographic, economic, and technological factors
would yield a range of possible outcomes. Indeed, we conducted a limited analysis (summarized in
the next section and elaborated in the Appendix) that characterizes various plausible future electric
generation technologies in the United States and the range of costs associated with each. Our more
general estimates are generally consistent with midpoints along the ranges indicated in our detailed
analysis.
Projections of Electricity Capacity and Generation
We tap several sources for forecasts of future electricity capacity requirements and electricity
generation (or sales), notably, regular forecasts from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy
Information Administration (EIA) and the IEA, which is affiliated with the OECD. The World Bank
also releases periodic projections for selected developing countries and regions. Although the scope
of coverage and certain specific features of the analysis differ among these efforts, the trends of
greatest interest for our purposes tend to be in agreement. The single most conspicuous, if intuitively
obvious, point of agreement concerns the near certainty of markedly varying rates of growth—and,
therefore, shifting regional distribution—of electricity markets around the world. These projections
are predicated on a consistent relationship between economic growth and growth in the demand for
energy in general, and for electricity in particular.
That expectation is strikingly reflected in several interrelated sets of data:
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•  Electricity generation in developing countries accounted for nearly 30% of the world total
in 1996; by 2020, EIA projects that share to grow to around 40%. China and India alone
show increases indicating that their shares will be 10–20%.6
•  Over the 1995–2020 interval, IEA estimated new worldwide generating capacity
requirements of nearly 3,500 GW, half of which is attributed to the needs of developing
countries.7
•  Average annual growth rates in electricity consumption for selected countries and regions
show sharply contrasting trajectories over 1995–2020: United States, 1.2%; all industrial
countries, 1.9%; former Soviet Union, 1.2%; China, 5.8%; India, 5.3%; all developing
countries, 4.6% (see Table 1). These numbers are, of course, not preordained; thus, it is
possible that under a relatively low price regime, U.S. electricity demand will grow more
than the posited 1.2% (see Box 3).
•  With economic growth, electricity progressively becomes the preferred form of energy—
both to provide creature comforts and to meet the needs of a more diversified and
sophisticated industrial structure. Thus, across OECD countries, energy consumption
accounted for by the electric power sector increased from more than 20% in 1971 to 35%
in 1991 and is projected to reach 40% in 2010. The corresponding percentages for China
at these three benchmark years are around 15%, 20%, and 30%.8
In Section II, we return to discussion of these market trends in developing countries, specifically with
respect to the investment climate that might be expected for new energy initiatives such as SSP and
other technologies. In general, however, determining the likely future trend in electricity capacity and
consumption is anything but straightforward—for the developed or the developing world. With a
“bottom-up” approach, discrete attention would need to be accorded to the technological, engineering,
and economic factors that govern electricity use in specific sectors of the economy, such as extractive
industries, manufacturing, residential and commercial structures, and transportation. With the much
more collapsed “top-down” perspective—adequate for present purposes—the principal determining
factors are the assumed growth in gross domestic product (GDP) (or income). Other factors are the
income elasticity of demand, which describes the change in electricity demand accompanying the
change in GDP—a relationship that subsumes both behavioral and technological factors—and
changes in the relative price of electricity.
                                                     
6 See EIA 1998b.
7 See IEA 1998.
8 See IEA 1994.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Table 1. World Total Net Electricity Consumption and GDP Growth by Region, Reference Case, 1995–2020.
Change/year, 1995–2020 (%) Electricity consumption (billion kWh)
Actual Projected
Region/country
1990 1995 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Consumption GDP
Industrialized countries
North America 3,255 3,759 3,859 3,984 4,347 4,713 5,050 5,354 1.4 2.1
United States
a 2,713 3,163 3,243 3,318 3,601 3,877 4,115 4,308 1.2
Canada 435 462 473 499 528 574 625 680 1.6
Mexico 107 134 144 167 217 261 310 367 4.1
Western Europe 2,115 2,286 2,330 2,720 3,064 3,419 3,781 4,182 2.4 2.4
Industrialized Asia 930 1,068 1,090 1,263 1,393 1,531 1,666 1,812 2.1 2.3
Japan 750 864 882 976 1,063 1,162 1,258 1,363 1.8
Australasia 180 204 207 287 330 369 407 450 3.2
Total industrialized 6,299 7,133 7,279 7,968 8,804 9,663 10,497 11,349 1.9 2.3
FSU/Eastern Europe
FSU 1,488 1,168 1,133 1,108 1,236 1,366 1,472 1,586 1.2 3.6
Eastern Europe 420 384 401 401 449 515 584 662 2.2 4.4
Total FSU/E. Europe 1,908 1,552 1,535 1,509 1,685 1,881 2,056 2,248 1.5 3.7
Developing countries
Developing Asia 1,268 1,912 2,002 2,489 3,283 4,160 5,255 6,665 5.1 6.2
China 551 881 925 1,076 1,476 1,975 2,657 3,574 5.8 7.9
India 257 367 378 541 706 888 1,092 1,344 5.3
Other Asia 460 663 699 872 1,101 1,297 1,505 1,747 4.0 5.2
Middle East 221 295 301 309 362 419 483 554 2.6 3.8
Africa 285 320 332 378 459 552 657 782 3.6 4.1
CA and SA 449 575 604 711 902 1,088 1,290 1,548 4.0 4.3
Brazil 229 288 303 371 497 637 813 1,039 5.3
Other CA and SA 220 286 301 340 406 451 477 509 2.3
Total developing 2,224 3,102 3,239 3,886 5,007 6,220 7,684 9,548 4.6 5.2
Total world 10,431 11,767 12,053 13,363 15,495 17,764 20,237 23,145 2.7 3.1
Notes: Based on reference-level GDP forecast. Electricity consumption equals generation plus imports minus exports minus distribution losses. FSU = Former
Soviet Union; CA, Central America; SA, South America.
Sources: For actual values, EIA (1998b, Table 6-2); for projected values, EIA (1997a, Table A8; 1997b).
a Includes the fifty states and the District of Columbia. U.S. territories are included in Australasia.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Box 3. Are We Running Out of Oil?
A recent article in Science magazine contained only the latest in a long line of prognoses that go back 100 years,
in which oil’s near-term “exhaustion”—a concept bereft of economic logic—is viewed with near inexorable
certainty (Kerr 1998; see also the response by Toman and Darmstadter [1998]). During the first half of the
twentieth century, a succession of assessments by analysts and officials of the U.S. Geological Survey predicted
a peaking in U.S. oil production and, effectively, its exhaustion within one or two decades of the date of the
forecast. Then, Ayres and Scarlott (1952), whose point of departure was a 1950 estimate of proved world oil
reserves of 78 billion barrels, predicted that future discoveries would sustain cumulative production of 550
billion barrels at most. In fact, by the end of 1997, proved global reserves stood at a trillion barrels, and
cumulative production since 1950 totaled 756 billion barrels (BP’s Statistical Review, various years; EIA’s
Annual Energy Outlook, various years). Kerr’s article cites five (of six) recent studies that predict a peaking in
world oil production by 2020. Although such studies follow a long-established pattern of alarm over resource
scarcity, an equally well-established (though perhaps not as sensational) body of literature questions that
perspective. One effective refutation of the scarcity thesis, for example, is contained in numerous writings of M.
A. Adelman, now a professor of economics emeritus at MIT and undeniably, throughout his career, one of the
most astute analysts of the world oil market and the dynamics of oil reserve development and estimation. (For a
recent retrospective account of his views, see Adelman 1997, 13–46.) We simply note three fundamental points
bearing on this issue:
•  There has been a persistent failure to distinguish between the concept of proved, recoverable reserves—
which firms tend to view as their “on-the-shelf” inventory for commercial planning horizons—and that of
discoverable resources, which, partly in response to long-term price expectations and with opportunities for
technological innovation, warrant investment and exploitation over a much more distant time span.
•  Technological progress—admittedly an elusive factor to predict and quantify—can offset poor geological
prospects. Thus, the onset of three-dimensional seismic exploration, horizontal drilling, and the
development of resources at ever greater ocean depths during the past several decades promises to
undergird production prospects that few would have predicted twenty-five years ago.
•  Most telling of all, it is a matter of recorded fact that, notwithstanding periodic episodes of short-term
volatility (including the price run-up during the 1970s, the ensuing price slump, and the current escalation),
long-term oil prices held steady throughout much of the twentieth century—a trend entirely consistent with
an unfolding supply picture that has unfailingly undermined predictions of running out. Those who believe
that a genuine discontinuity in oil resource availability is now imminent face another logical paradox: Why
would numerous companies and countries holding increasingly scarce resources be content to sell those
assets at fire sale prices rather than managing their disposition in a revenue-maximizing way that
capitalizes on the inexorable price rises that some analysts see as inevitable? To be sure, some (“high
discount”) countries may be so hard-pressed for cash as to ignore an economically more rational time path
for managing their reserves. (A still useful discussion of factors affecting discount rates of oil-producing
countries is presented by Bohi and Russell [1975, especially 45–54].) Turmoil in Nigeria could, for
example, bring about such a policy. It also is conceivable that, at some point, fear of “technological
obsolescence” of oil in the ground, because of restrictions on the use of carbon-containing fuels, would
cause producers to accelerate production and deter aggressive reserve development. But, as best as one can
judge from a present vantage point, it is hard to imagine that purposefully rapid depletion of reserves is
endemic among oil producers.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Note that according to Table 1, to varying degrees throughout the world, electricity demand growth
lags GDP growth. The lag would most likely be still greater without the assumption of stable real cost
and price (discussed in the next section). Thus, slower electricity demand growth (relative to GDP
growth) reflects the widespread potential for enhanced efficiency in the application of electricity in
different activities. The countries of the former Soviet Union are particularly conspicuous candidates
for such improvement. Although EIA’s underlying analysis (for the estimates shown in Table 1) is
sketchy, one can assume that the elimination of controlled prices and retreat from a rampantly
mismanaged energy system that invited huge waste are key reasons for projection of the region’s
relatively slow electricity growth.
Other factors may impact demand. For instance, the current direction of information and
communication technology could conceivably result in a substantial “decoupling” of economic
growth and energy demand growth, at least in the developed economies. We largely exclude this
possibility from our analysis. In addition, opportunities for achieving greater efficiency exist as well
in the production of electricity. For example, the IEA projects important gains both in China’s
conversion of fuels into electricity (the so-called heat rate) and in the capacity utilization of the
country’s installed generating capacity. If these developments come to pass, then the challenges to the
competitiveness of SSP significantly increase.
Cost of Electricity Generation
Analysis of SSP’s ability to compete with terrestrial electricity generation obliges us to make
estimates of comparative electricity production costs over a time frame of fifteen to twenty-five years.
Unfortunately, current—let alone projected—terrestrial generation costs are hard to come by,
particularly for those countries or regions that, by virtue of size and electricity demand growth, are
likely to constitute the most promising markets for SSP. This state of affairs exists even though the
capacity and generation estimates cited earlier must embed some necessary relationship, however
unspecified, to cost and price.
If delivered energy prices in such markets could reasonably be taken to be based on cost of service,
with minimal distortion arising from subsidies and other regulatory intrusion, one could perhaps work
back from prices to approximate costs. But such a tack is likely to prove futile for many situations in
developing countries (or transition economies). Anderson (1997) cited surveys that showed
generating (that is, busbar) costs that frequently were twice the average tariff charged final
consumers. In rural areas of many countries, the multiple is much greater still. Although designed to
make electricity more affordable, such policies have resulted in deterioration of, and underinvestment
in, electricity supply systems.
Accordingly, our approach to estimating projected electricity production costs in markets of primary
interest was to exploit projections of U.S. generating costs as a basis for framing ranges of costs for
other regions or countries. We took this approach for several reasons:
•  Deregulation of foreign electric power markets would in itself narrow international cost
differentials. This trend already has been suggested by recent public bids for independent
power projects (IPPs) in Japan and Thailand.
•  Resource inputs (except for hydropower) trade in a world market that is increasingly
characterized by world prices; it is true of oil and coal and may become the case moreResources for the Future Macauley and others
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often with gas via long-distance pipelines of liquified natural gas (LNG; note, for
example, the rising share of natural gas, shown in Table 2).
•  Globalization of investment and technology (for example, the energy investments by
Enron Corporation in India) would, at least directionally, contribute to convergence of
cost.
•  Given the diversity of energy sources that can be used to generate electricity, interfuel
competition to serve the power market can help to hold costs down.
With the foregoing reasons in mind, we assume that nationwide U.S. generating costs for plants
coming on line in 1996 averaged about 3.7 cents/kWh. This value is neither conceptually nor
empirically an entirely “hard” number. Among the problems, the number reflects a mix of coal and
other plants, whereas a long-term marginal cost estimate might revolve principally around combined
cycle gas plants; also, elements of accounting cost may be intermingled with purely economic cost.
But it probably can serve as a base year jumping-off point.
Projecting generation costs for 2020 is necessarily predicated on a multiplicity of assumptions,
different combinations of which yield numerous alternative cases. The assumptions include the prices
of resource inputs to power stations, heat rates, capacity factors, the degree of deregulation in the
electric utility market, capital costs for different technologies, and discount rates. The important point
we recognize is that in almost no cases are constant-dollar generation costs in 2020 likely to be higher
than prevailing recent levels; they very probably will be significantly lower. This fact is reflected in
EIA’s reference case projection of delivered electricity prices: From 7 cents/kWh in 1996, they
decline to 5.5 cents/kWh in 2020.9 If we assume that transmission and distribution costs retain their
present share of delivered electricity prices, a “reference case” decline in U.S. generation costs from
around 3.7 cents/kWh in 1996 to around 3 cents/kWh in 2020 seems entirely reasonable.
A much more detailed spreadsheet analysis for the United States to estimate costs among an array of
technologies helps to substantiate the forecasts and the reasoning underlying the foregoing paragraphs
(as noted earlier, our calculations and assumptions are described in the Appendix). For fossil fuel–
based technologies, we find cost estimates around 1.7–3 cents/kWh as a “low range” and some higher
estimates as high as 10 cents/kWh. For renewable technologies, our range of estimates is considerably
wider, from around 1.7 cents/kWh to as much as 54.5 cents/kWh. All things considered, we find that
our ballpark figure of 3 cents/kWh is a good proxy for the technologies with which SSP will most
likely have to compete (according to EIA, they are likely to be dominated by combined cycle gas and
pulverized coal plants).
From this starting point, what might we prudently assume to be the largest realistic multiple for
electric power production costs in developing countries? Such countries now are characterized by
grossly distorted pricing structures, trade barriers, numerous transaction costs (for example, the
formidable challenge of just setting up a customer billing system), and other investment disincentives.
In contrast to the estimated U.S. generating cost of approximately 3.7 cents/kWh and on the basis of
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informal discussion with several experts, we estimate that for the part of the world dominated by large
markets in developing countries, present-day generation costs average around 5.5 cents/kWh. A
recently released OECD report indicates that coal-fired plants in India and China scheduled to come
on line during 2005–10 would generate electricity likely between 3.2 and 4 cents/kWh (expressed in
1996 prices.)10 This downward trend portends significant competition for SSP from conventional
technology.
Table 2. World Energy Consumption for Electricity Generation by Region and
Percentage of Fuel Share, 1995–2020.




Natural gas 10.5 23.4
Coal 35.7 33.3
Nuclear 25.1 13.9
Renewable resources 22.2 24.1
FSU/Eastern Europe
Oil 11.3 14.6
Natural gas 38.3 53.2
Coal 27.4 15.8
Nuclear 10.9 0.0
Renewable resources 12.1 16.1
Developing countries
Oil 14.0 11.2
Natural gas 12.4 17.5
Coal 43.9 45.7
Nuclear 3.2 6.4
Renewable resources 26.7 19.2
Total world
Oil 9.4 9.0
Natural gas 15.9 24.8
Coal 36.4 36.3
Nuclear 16.7 8.9
Renewable resources 21.6 21.0
Note: Values represent EIA’s Reference Case. FSU = Former Soviet Union.
Source: EIA 1997b.
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Resource Constraints?
The projections presented earlier assume that, for the period covered by our report, the supply and
real cost of electricity will not be impaired by scarcer—hence, costlier—fuels needed by the power
sector. The EIA has tested the implications of different world oil prices (which can serve as a general
proxy for such global supply constraints) on electricity for the United States in 2020. It found that
even a scenario in which a high world oil price in 2020 exceeded the “reference” case (which
underlies the preceding discussion and the estimates of Tables 1 and 2) by 30% affects electricity
sales and prices relatively modestly.11 That outcome is explained by a shift to the use of coal and, in
particular, natural gas—fuels whose abundance during the period in question and substantially
beyond will keep electricity generation costs in check. To be sure, the fuel component of the cost of
generation is not inconsequential. Therefore, recurrent anxiety about energy resource limits and their
possible impact on electricity costs is understandable. At the same time, given this shift in fuel inputs
at power stations, it is worth noting that the vastness of U.S. and global resources of coal should not
be subject to dispute. Natural gas, too, is increasingly viewed as a sizeable resource. In terms of
geological assessment, it is a relatively “young” resource whose exploitability stems from the
feasibility of pipeline transport, which began only half a century ago, and ocean transport of LNG,
which began still more recently. As a result, natural gas historically has been flared as uneconomic,
with geographically limited exploration incentives until recently.
Of course, discussions of resource scarcity have centered most frequently on oil—historically, the
most versatile of primary energy resources and the resource whose price has served as a rough
benchmark for energy in general. However, it is an undeniable fact that a century of repeated
predictions of the imminent disruptive prospects of oil scarcity have failed to materialize, even as real
oil prices have remained stable over the long run. This record of misjudgment does not preclude an
altogether different outcome for coal or natural gas in the decades ahead. But it does impose a burden
of proof on analysts who dismiss lessons conveyed by this historical experience (see Box 3).
In brief, history is no certain guide to the future. The wolf that has so far failed to appear as predicted
may still be lurking near the door. But it is not out of the question that constraints, if they are to
appear, may come from quarters other than geologic tightfistedness. Four examples come to mind.
Environmental Concerns
Plausibly, severe environmental restrictions on combustion of fossil fuels could translate into an
economic burden absent from the projections reviewed earlier. Although recent studies suggest that
the damage (or “social cost”) of electricity generated by conventional means may be relatively
small—particularly for the noncoal resources likely to figure increasingly in future capacity additions
(see Box 4)—the costs of abatement that some policymakers may propose could be less than or
exceed that magnitude. Indeed, early and stringent constraints on CO2 emissions could easily invite
the second prospect. Issues of pollution, deforestation, and global warming are receiving growing
attention by the world community. However, cleaner forms of energy have been introduced into the
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developing world in numerous initiatives to ameliorate these problems, and some governments
already have begun to use renewable energy technologies as a tool of economic development. For
example, India, China, South Africa, and several other countries have begun to use renewable energy
as a means of providing at least limited localized power to small communities without the cost of
stringing power lines to rural areas. Increasing investment in this infrastructure will likely lead to an
installed base with which SSP would have to compete.
Box 4. Fossil Fuels and the Environment: Estimates of the Social Costs
Advocates of SSP have suggested that it offers an attractive alternative to many conventional fuels as
a source of electricity, in part because SSP would not contribute to air pollution or other health or
environmental problems. However, an important finding of the most recent studies of the relationship
between fuel cycles and health and environmental effects is that damages associated with new
generation plants are surprisingly modest (see Krupnick and Burtraw 1996). The monetary estimates
of the environmental and health damages, or “social costs,” of electricity fuel cycles suggest the
following:
Table B-1. Estimated Costs of Power Generation.








Note: The estimates for nuclear power include engineering estimates of accident probability.
a Pressurized water reactor.
b Combined cycle gas turbine.
To these estimates might be added the damages associated with greenhouse gases and their
relationship with global climate change. Several studies have attempted to make some very tentative
estimates of the long-term effects of increases in CO2; the monetized value appears to be on the order
of 0.3–0.6 cents/kWh, assuming a discount rate (to take into account the long-term effects) of 3%.
Taken together, these estimates imply that the “bottom line” based on the most recent research on
monetized damages—and given the numerous caveats which the researchers are the first to
acknowledge—is on the order of 2 cents/kWh. To the extent that requirements for new power plants
are not met, developing countries will continue to meet energy needs by burning biofuels, operating
antiquated power plants, and attempting to integrate renewable energy systems into their economies.
However, concerns about air pollution or its contribution to global climate change are not presently a
major factor in power investment decisions in developing countries, although local pollution
problems in large cities such as Mexico City may cause countries to favor nonpolluting technology.
Willingness to pay for clean technologies tends to rise with rising incomes; however, in developing
countries, clean energy may rank as a somewhat lower (although related) priority than clean water,
improved sanitation services, and health care.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Other Health and Safety Concerns
SSP itself may have associated with it sources of potential actual or perceived health and safety risks,
such as those that may result from the electromagnetic field (EMF) around its ground stations. One
expert with whom we consulted emphasized that few epidemiological data are available to understand
the effects on health of the power levels that are likely to be associated with SSP. Moreover, he
pointed out that reliable data are difficult to obtain because they require the exposure of a large
population for long duration. Additionally, monitoring protocols at international and national levels of
government have yet to be established for beam power densities such as those of a system like SSP.
He also emphasized that even if health and safety risks were negligible or manageable, public
perception of such risks would likely figure prominently in their acceptance of SSP.12
Unusually High Demand Growth
A third possibility is that a sustained period of unusually high economic growth could strain the
ability of current resources to meet the resulting energy demand at given real prices. As we suggest in
Box 1, this situation could conceivably open up a promising niche market for alternative energy
sources, including ones for use in electricity generation. Much would depend on how enduring that
strain turned out to be; “alternative” energy projects initiated in the 1970s with the expectation of
prolonged high and rising energy prices experienced substantial disappointment.
Perceived Risks of Energy Import Dependence
Finally, the perceived risks of dependence on imported energy could lead to support for policies of
greater self-sufficiency—leading, in turn, to higher electricity costs or alternative sources of
electricity. The case for protectionism is far from clear, conceptually or empirically.13 Still, despite
OPEC’s conspicuous failure to sustain any extended control over the world oil market after its short-
lived success in the 1970s (and recent supply manipulation), the possibility that exploitable oil
resources will be disproportionately concentrated in few enough countries so as to invite more
effective cartelization, thus contributing to a long-term run up of other energy resources, cannot be
totally dismissed.
Somewhat parenthetically, we note that the question of energy dependence may present a rather
unique challenge in the context of an SSP regime. A country fueling its power plants conventionally
has a choice of fuel mixes and diversified geographic supply sources that ensure some considerable
resilience to the economic shock of a disruption. By contrast, a developing country reliant on another
country’s space-generated power for a significant portion of its baseload electricity may enjoy little
such flexibility. It therefore may look to equity participation in an SSP system, seek other means of
protecting itself against the potential discontinuity of external supply, or possibly reject SSP out of
hand even if SSP made economic sense. This issue deserves a close look.
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Postscript: The 1998 Global Economic Downturn
Long-term energy projections and the economic growth assumptions to which they are significantly
related do not assume a linear path over the projection period. That is, average annual growth rates,
such as those cited in the preceding section, have built into them the normal business cycle
fluctuations historically characteristic of market economies. The question to ponder is whether the
economic slowdown accompanying the financial and capital market upheavals that recently have
roiled some parts of the world (particularly East Asia) is sufficiently abnormal as to cast doubt on
projections even as distant as twenty to twenty-five years in the future. In other words, is it reasonable
to assume that whatever stagnation has recently been experienced (particularly in East Asian markets)
will be offset by higher-than-average growth during a recovery phase over the next few years—
justifying the reference case projections in Table 1? And is it likely that selected policy retreats from
free market processes (for example, in Malaysia, Russia, and Venezuela) are a temporary
phenomenon unlikely to undermine longer-run prospects? This question is of particular interest,
because the unfolding electricity picture we hypothesize is importantly predicated on the existence of
policies and institutions in which energy choices can be exercised within a relatively unfettered
domestic and global marketplace rather than hobbled by the persistence of various market distortions.
This study professes no basis for answering these questions, either reassuringly or pessimistically.
Clearly, a lower economic growth trajectory also signifies slower electricity demand growth. In EIA’s
International Energy Outlook 1998 (EIA 1997b), a slow economic growth scenario of 3.7% yearly is
associated with 3.1% electricity growth; these values contrast with the 5.2% and 4.6% rates,
respectively, for developing countries listed in Table 1.
But whichever of these scenarios seems more compelling, the present situation in global markets may
be serious enough to inject a substantial degree of uncertainty into planning decisions for
infrastructural projects as basic as electricity. For that matter, another study would need to judge the
implications of abnormally high growth as well. After all, since around 1985, utility forecasts in the
United States have been consistently higher than actual growth (see Box 5). In any case, greater
uncertainty translates into greater risk, and greater risk translates into increased returns on capital
demanded by investors—even for conventional energy projects, let alone for those of a more
speculative nature.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Box 5. The Case for Higher U.S. Electricity Demand Growth
As indicated earlier, and as evident from Table 1, rather anemic electricity demand growth is forecast
for the United States and the total of the industrialized countries (1.2% and 1.9% per year,
respectively) (EIA 1998b).
 Are prospects pointing to significantly higher long-term growth in
industrialized countries in the future? Historical actual and forecasted electric energy demand growth
rates for the United States from a consistent industry source, the North American Electric Reliability
Council (NERC), suggest that this could be the case (NERC 1998a). In no ten-year period from 1974
to the present did U.S. electricity demand drop below 2.2%. Although utility forecasts were
consistently higher than actual growth until 1985, actual electric energy demand growth has been
consistently underforecasted since then. In fact, the most recent NERC forecast has, for the first time,
pointed out the issue of consistently low forecasts and the likely ramifications (NERC 1998b).
 In
addition, technological innovation can create demand for electricity even faster than the expected
improvements in efficiency and rising real income.
Several implications would follow if U.S. electricity demand growth were to increase at a higher rate
than current estimates project. First, much more capacity would be needed, because a 2.4% average
annual growth rate would increase electricity demand 124% of the projected 1.2% average annual
growth rate. Second, any environmental control strategies that seek to limit U.S. electricity demand
growth, directly or indirectly, would be more costly, with growth higher than that currently assumed
as a baseline. Should such factors carry over into the experience of developed countries between now
and 2020 or so, both industrialized and developing countries may be in search of additional electricity
supplies.
II. Trends in Power Generation for Developing Nations
In Section I, we noted that two points of agreement among estimates of future electricity capacity and
generation are the near certainty of markedly varying rates of growth and shifting regional
distribution of electricity markets around the world. In this section, we address in somewhat greater
detail the markets in developing countries.
Under current development trends, the cumulative capacity requirement for electrical energy will total
some 3,500 GW between 1995 and 2020.14 Of this total, only 30% (around 1,000 GW) will be in the
OECD member industrial countries. The remaining 70% of capacity requirements (2,500 GW) will be
split between China and other developing countries. In this context, the developing world consists of
China, India, other developing Asian countries, the Middle East, Central America, South America,
and Africa.15
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According to some projections, China’s requirement alone (about 1,740 GW) will surpass that of all
OECD countries together. The remaining developing countries will require 700 GW of capacity. If
these requirements were met, the developing world and China would consume approximately 40% of
the world’s electric energy production by 2020. But for these requirements to be met, some
formidable problems must be overcome.
Financial constraints are foremost among these problems. Assuming an average installed capacity
cost of around $900/kW to construct the capacity required by year 2020, total capital cost
requirements would be slightly more than $3.3 trillion.16 Of this amount, the developing world would
require $2.3 trillion by 2020, or an average of $92 billion a year from 1995 to 2020 (translating into
97,300 MW per year of new capacity in the developing world). Record levels of foreign debt make it
difficult for these countries to borrow additional funds for power projects. More than 70% of
developing countries were net importers of energy in 1987 and paid for these imports with hard
currency and hard currency loans that effectively reduced opportunities to deploy capital on
infrastructure projects.17
In most cases, developing nations lack local equity markets and have smaller, less liquid debt markets
that are characterized by shorter-term loans.18 In addition, lending for power projects by multilateral
lending institutions has decreased substantially from levels that were generally insufficient in the first
place.19 For instance, the World Bank currently provides roughly $3 billion annually for energy sector
projects, a small fraction of the developing world’s total expenditures.20 In total, annual capital
spending on power generation in the developing world is roughly $50 billion to $60 billion.
Independent power projects (IPPs) have been cited as a new source of capital for the developing
world. In an IPP, private firms build power plants for individual customers and government agencies.
IPPs financed more than $20 billion of new capacity in 1997, nearly $11 billion 1996, and around $9
billion in 1995.21 However, in 1997, only 17,000 MW of new capacity was put under contract.22
A major factor influencing the willingness of lending institutions and IPPs to finance investment in
developing countries is the perceived risk associated with unstable governments, economies, and
currencies. Most developing countries are rated “noninvestment grade” (their loans will carry a higher
interest rate). These loans reflect risk premiums ranging from around 100 to more than 200 basis
points over benchmark floating interest rates derived from either the London Inter-bank Overnight
Rate (LIBOR) or U.S. Treasury Notes. In addition, IPPs also carry other conditions designed to
reduce risk, including guarantees of currency convertibility and protection in case of changes of law
or regulatory regime; protection against financial market disruptions and fluctuations; guarantees of
                                                     
16 IEA 1998.
17 OTA 1992.
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interest, exchange, and tariff rates; and guarantees of debt and revenue.23 The combination of higher
interest rates and higher expected rates of return by the investors means that the average cost per
kilowatt-hour is higher in the developing world than in the developed world if all other factors are the
same. Host countries have been willing to agree to these conditions because few other financing
options are available.
It is important to note that these trends affecting investment in the power industry reflect the
overarching concern of financial markets about the general state of the emerging market economies.
In an article in the Economist, a Goldman Sachs analyst predicted that net capital flows to developing
countries could be $120 billion in 1999, down from $247 billion in 1997.24 And according to the
same article, even when the emerging markets eventually rebound, investors will be far more
cautious: “The long-maturities, non-collaterised bonds and complex project-finance deals that
characterized emerging markets will be out. Instead, investors will want bonds with short
maturities—‘plain vanilla’ deals that are easy to sell if they again get cold feet.”
Investment also will be more difficult in countries that have not attempted to privatize the power
sector and continue to subsidize this sector as a tool of national policy (in much the same manner that
agriculture is subsidized). One effect of subsidies has been insufficient revenues to either maintain
generation capacity or build new capacity. As noted earlier, the result has been power shortages that
are exacerbated by industries and consumers using excessive amounts of electricity because of its
artificially low price caused by subsidies. Taken together, these financial and institutional issues are
likely to make power projects—including SSP—very difficult to fund in the developing world
without some changes in the status quo.
III. Economic Modeling in Support of SSP Programmatic Decisions
Thus far, we have described the future market for power. In addition to this focus, during the course
of our report, we had the opportunity to share methods and conclusions with the engineering working
groups analyzing the technical design of SSP. The uniqueness of dialog among economists and
engineers at an early stage of technology development prompts us to include here a brief discussion
about the usefulness of this exchange of information. Accordingly, in this section we depart from
discussion of electricity markets to focus on economic modeling in support of the SSP program.
Such modeling can shed light on the future marketplace in which SSP is likely to operate, providing
key feedback for SSP design and engineering. One example is the importance of supply reliability
and geographic coverage to electricity customers. These factors clearly bear on the technical design of
SSP. Another example is the trend toward decentralized management and private-sector ownership
and operation of electricity supplies. This factor, too, has implications for technical design.
Economic models also can establish the potential economic benefits to the nation that may result from
a government investment in technology development and provide a formal means for structuring an
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efficient long-term, multiphase technology funding program. To date, detailed modeling of the
economics of SSP has been limited in several respects (see Feingold and others 1997). The existing
models of SSP might be improved to include formal use of uncertainty and risk analysis techniques
or, as minimum, the use of expected values for the important variables. In addition, further exercise of
these models might allow the implications of key assumptions—such as those related to the cost of
robotic assembly, refurbishment and maintenance, and on-orbit operations—to be explicitly
considered.
In using economic modeling to ascertain the potential national benefits of SSP, we caution against
metrics of “job creation.” Jobs are more properly treated as a cost and not a benefit unless the nation’s
unemployment rate is especially high.25 Instead, we urge that consideration be given to the relative
return on taxpayer investment in SSP compared with other publicly financed energy technologies
(such as photovoltaics) and other more general taxpayer investments.
If future studies of SSP design suggest that it can be competitive with terrestrial energy sources and
that reasonable benefits are likely to result from its development and use, then additional economic
analysis will become useful in the planning and structuring of an efficient technology development
and demonstration program. For example, a decision analytic approach could consider the economics
of alternative mission designs, consider the possibility of failure and termination rules for SSP
investment, and allow for data to be provided by experts that have disparate backgrounds (that is, no
single research discipline—be it engineering or economics—may understand in depth the entire
program).26 To this end, SSP research should continue to involve interdisciplinary teams, convening
regularly, with NASA sponsorship.
IV. Roles of Government and the Private Sector
Governments in the United States and abroad have become active in promoting many activities to
foster the commercial development of space. Generally speaking, a host of factors may discourage
private-sector financing of new technologies, such as large capital requirements, long lead times to
commercial operation, lengthy payback periods, perceived high technical risks, and the inability to
capture proprietary benefits of developing the technology. These hurdles have led governments to
pursue, with mixed success, various programs and policies to underwrite commercial business
ventures. For example, governments have funded or performed basic and applied research and
development (R&D); established or encouraged the building of public infrastructure, such as roads,
railroads, airports, and harbors; become early adopters or “anchor tenants” of new products and
services, helping to establish the market; and enacted and enforced standards and regulations in areas
such as safety and environmental protection. Cohen and Noll (1991) and Rose (1986) discuss these
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and other approaches to government intervention in the cases of commercialization of several
technologies, including space activities. Box 6 illustrates some of these approaches.
Our view is that in the case of SSP as a source of terrestrial power, it is premature for government to
make commitments such as anchor tenancy, cost sharing, low interest loans, or loan guarantees. SSP
is at such an early stage of development that these options are inappropriate at this time. For example,
anchor tenancy can significantly reduce market risk, but the government cannot enter into such an
arrangement until a commercial entity has chosen a system design and committed to building it. For
similar reasons, cost sharing is also premature; it requires agreement on system concepts and designs,
a development timetable, detailed system cost estimates, and, above all, a well-grounded expectation
by government that a commitment of taxpayer funds serves the public good. As we noted earlier, we
urge that decisions on continued public funding of SSP consider the relative return on taxpayer
investment compared with other energy technologies in particular, and other public sector
investments in general. Also, past projections of large market penetration of new power-generation
technologies (such as nuclear and solar power) have not been borne out by experience.27 With regard
to low-interest loans and loan repayment guarantees, they, too, await an industry commitment to a
more advanced stage of development.
For several reasons, it seems reasonable to invite industry (especially electric utilities) to be involved
in the technical and economic analyses that assess the commercial viability of SSP and the mix of
R&D that might be appropriate to spur development of technologies intended for the commercial SSP
market. One reason for this view is that trends toward electricity deregulation in the United States and
abroad favor the private sector as the ultimate manager and operator of SSP systems. In addition,
utility and energy companies can provide important insights regarding the technical and financial
interface of SSP with terrestrial power systems. These companies also will be interested in the
development of technical components that serve both space and terrestrial power needs (for instance,
solar cells and power transmission).
This terrestrially based use of SSP aside, important applications of SSP may include provision of
power to nonterrestrial systems such as the International Space Station, other large orbiting platforms,
lunar bases, or deep space probes. In addition, space-based commercial markets might include SSP as
a “power plug in space” for communications and remote sensing satellites. These opportunities
should be investigated in the course of future analyses of SSP. Importantly, such discussion should
include interested commercial entities.
                                                     
27 In fairness, we should note that public R&D support did contribute to driving down the cost of solar and
other renewable energy sources. However, their market penetration was impeded by the decline in conventional
energy costs (see Burtraw and others 1999).Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Box 6. Government Approaches to Influencing Private-Sector Investment:
A Taxonomy
Cooperative arrangements Loans
Research, development, and demonstration Guaranteed









V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Understanding the electricity markets in developed and developing countries in 2020 or so rests on
informed judgment. We have sought to bring the best data sources and collective insights to bear in
our study and hope that the framework we sketch serves useful as technological development of SSP
proceeds.
We summarize our conclusions in three sets of observations and one list of recommendations for
further study.
The Market for Electricity
Our first set of observations concerns the market for electricity in general, because it is the economic
backdrop against which SSP would play a role as 2020 approaches:
•  Current trends indicate increasing global demand for energy in general, and electricity in
particular, from now to 2020. Electricity demand growth rates will vary significantly by
region of the world and by stage of economic development. The highest growth rates will
be in developing economies.
•  Deregulation of electricity internationally will strengthen the trend toward decentralized,
private ownership and management of utilities in most countries (developed and
developing)—a major departure from the tradition of nationalized utilities.
•  Nevertheless, investment in and operation of conventional electricity markets in
developing economies likely will be, or will be perceived as, risky due to capital
constraints, infrastructure limitations, and institutional and environmental factors.
•  Constant-dollar electricity generation costs in 2020 likely will be no higher than
prevailing recent levels and very likely will be significantly lower.
•  The monetary value of environmental externalities in electricity generation appears to be
significantly lower than some studies have indicated.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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•  Global climate change is not presently a major factor in power investment decisions in
developing countries. Willingness to pay for “clean” technologies tends to rise with
increasing incomes, but in developing countries, clean energy may not be the highest
ranking priority among health and environmental concerns.
•  Resource constraints on fossil fuels are unlikely to be a factor in this time frame, other
than possible short-term supply disruptions caused by political and economic factors.
Taken together, these observations suggest that conventional electricity generation in both developed
and developing countries may be more than adequate in terms of cost, supply, and environmental
factors.
Challenges for SSP in Competing with Terrestrial Electricity Generation
Our second set of observations pertains specifically to the challenges that SSP is likely to face in this
market:
•  The relative immaturity of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess
the validity of estimated costs and likely competitiveness of SSP. As in many space
development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reduction in the costs of space launch and
deployment and other key technologies is critical. As these reductions occur, the
economic viability of SSP may be more promising. Until then, it is premature for the U.S.
government to make commitments such as loan guarantees or tax incentives for SSP.
•  State-of-the-art conventional power-generation technologies increasingly incorporate
numerous environmental controls, eroding somewhat the environmental advantage of
alternatives to fossil fuel technologies.
•  Actual and/or perceived health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic
fields generated by SSP are likely to be of significant public concern.
•  National security and national economic considerations may discourage some countries
from participating in an SSP system operated by another country or group of countries.
Countries with these concerns may require equity participation in SSP, limit their reliance
on SSP only to a small share of their energy portfolio, or decline use of the technology
altogether.
These findings argue for the merits of furthering technical advance in technologies required not only
for SSP but for other space activities, and for special consideration of health and national security
concerns that might be associated with SSP.
The Role of Economic and Market Analysis as Technical Considerations of SSP
Progress
In the course of our study, the regular exchanges of information with the technical teams pursuing the
engineering design of SSP proved invaluable to us and, we hope, useful to them. Economic and
technical study must proceed in tandem, we believe, and specific recommendations as to further
directions that economic study might take with this exchange in mind include the following:Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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•  The energy industry should be invited to be “at the table” in relevant technical and
economic analyses of SSP—that is, to both participate in conducting the analysis and
learn about the results. The electric utility industry may be particularly interested in
helping to guide development of SSP technical components that also can be applied in
other terrestrial commercial power markets (for example, solar cells).
•  Modeling of the economics of SSP should explicitly incorporate analyses of risk and
uncertainty, include marketplace data about competition from terrestrial energy markets,
and provide a means for structuring an efficient long-term technology development
program that includes industry participation.
•  Continued public funding of SSP for terrestrial power markets must consider the relative
return on taxpayer investment in SSP compared with other technologies in general and
energy technologies in particular (for example, photovoltaics). It should be noted that
some past projections of large market penetration of new power-generation technologies
(for example, nuclear and solar) have not been borne out by experience.
Issues that Warrant Additional Study
Finally, we have identified specific topics for future research in addition to continued economic
study:
•  Our focus in this report is on the use of SSP in terrestrial markets. SSP capabilities may
be applicable to nonterrestrial systems such as the International Space Station, other large
orbiting platforms, lunar bases, and other activities that are used to explore and develop
space. The benefits and costs of these opportunities should be investigated in the course
of future SSP analyses.
•  Real and perceived safety, health, and environmental risks associated with SSP in its
terrestrial and nonterrestrial power markets should be assessed and discussed in public
forums that engage both scientists and the public.
Our final comment in concluding our study is that we seek neither to advocate nor to discourage
further investment in SSP. Rather, our aim is to provide a considered framework with “placeholders”
for new information as 2020 approaches and as such investment in SSP may continue. The challenges
remain: to provide information that adds to and strengthens this framework, and to continue
dispassionate dialog among economists and technical experts.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we offer additional details to characterize future markets for power-generation
technologies capable of providing baseload power in the 2015–20 reference time period. We use this
characterization to help understand the technologies that may compete with satellite solar power
(SSP).
First, we surveyed the literature on patterns of energy use; second, we made several technical
assumptions; and third, we identified the financial and technical parameters of energy technologies
that are likely competitors with SSP in the reference time period.
Energy Use Characteristics
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), if business proceeds as usual, then
energy use patterns are not expected to change dramatically in the next twenty or so years. The chart
below shows expected percentages of energy characteristics in 2020.28 Fossil fuels will continue to
supply up to 70% of the energy supply for power generation. By 2020, nuclear energy will decline to
less than 9%, and renewable energy will constitute 21% of total power generation.
Figure A-1.
Technical Assumptions
We assumed that the power-generation technologies considered in this analysis must exist today and
be commercially available in the reference time period. This assumption is based on the typical time
lag from invention to commercialization for new technologies. History shows that it is very unlikely
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that a new technology can be conceived, prototyped, put into production, and claim a significant
market share in a couple of decades.
Technologies Surveyed
We selected what we labeled as “evolutionary” and “innovative” technologies. Evolutionary
technologies include natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), pulverized coal, coal integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC), geothermal, and advanced nuclear power.
We define as evolutionary technologies those improvements over power industry systems currently in
use and with well-known technical characteristics; documented performance histories; and large,
installed infrastructures. They are all baseload power producers, have high reliability and availability,
operate on a partial load, and can provide standby power.
Innovative technologies include photovoltaics, wind power, and fuel cells. They represent a break
with the past and are not in widespread use today but could represent a sizeable component of the
worldwide power generating system in the next century. They also tend to operate at much smaller
scales than conventional systems, offering advantages in countries and locations with limited
infrastructure.29
Evolutionary Technologies
Natural Gas Combined Cycle
NGCC plants are currently the second most prevalent form of electrical power generation. Major
technological advances in recent years, along with natural gas prices, have made NGCC the current
“technology of choice” for new generation. These plants are popular because they are inexpensive to
build and operate, highly efficient, and available; they also emit lower levels of pollutants than coal
plants. They are also highly modular and scalable, which makes them relatively easy to install as local
requirements for power increase. NGCCs can range in size from 30 MW to more than 200 MW per
turbine. Commercial plants can be constructed at an approximate capital cost of $320–$800/kW.
Pulverized Coal
Pulverized coal plants are the primary source of baseload power in the world today and are expected
to be the second most prevalent source of power generation by 2020. They are usually very large (300
MW or more) because the greater capital costs associated with handling and burning the bulky solid
fuel and its products lend greater weight to economies of scale. These plants are a very mature
technology, expected to improve only slightly in the coming years. They are efficient and, except for
CO2 emissions, relatively nonpolluting when operated with advanced pollution control systems. They
                                                     
29 These data were screened by the authors and show our estimation of trends in the reference time period. The
raw data were compiled from multiple sources and validated by members of the team who represented Texaco,
Inc., Energy Ventures Analysis, Inc., and Strategic Insight, Ltd.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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also can take advantage of inexpensive indigenous coal deposits in many parts of the world, primarily
in China. Commercial plants can be constructed at an approximate capital cost of $950–$1195/kW.
Coal IGCC
Coal IGCC power production uses the same combined cycle technology as in natural gas plants, with
the addition of a coal gasifier. That additional stage, of course, means greater CO2 emissions than a
conventional coal plant. The gasifier converts coal gas into a clean fuel gas, which helps lower the
emissions usually inherent in coal. It is projected that in 2020, the total world coal consumption will
be 8,627 million metric tons per year. By some estimates, coal gasification could attain 30% of the
coal-fired market by 2020.
Gasification can play a significant role in the competitive power generation marketplace. In markets
where the demand for power is not supported by inexpensive indigenous fuels or where it is desirable
to use various low value and/or waste feed stocks in combination with coal, gasification can be
commercially competitive with other power generation solutions. Gasification also can handle feed
stocks such as petroleum coke, municipal wastes, industrial and hazardous wastes, and biomass.
This technology also is well suited to situations that require multiple products, including fuel or town
gas, hydrogen, chemicals, steam, and power. In addition, integrating the gasification facility with
existing oil or chemical plants, power plants, and other industrial sites allows increased efficiency and
flexibility. Commercial plants can be constructed for an approximate capital cost in the range of
$800–$1,000/kW.
Geothermal
Geothermal energy taps the heat energy being continuously generated within the Earth and
transmitted to the surface. To be useful for generating electricity or other geothermal applications,
subsurface water must be present to provide a heat transfer medium. Current technology does not
provide a way to tap the energy content of hot, dry rock.
Geothermal reservoirs are located and accessed using similar techniques to those used in oil and gas
exploration and production. Once a suitable reservoir is identified, wells are drilled to bring the hot,
high-pressure water to the surface. Reservoirs with water temperatures below 300 °F typically are
used for space heating, and agricultural and industrial applications. Higher-temperature resources are
more appropriate for electric power generation because they can generate steam to drive turbines.
Although some geothermal reservoirs contain potential pollutants, such as sulfur compounds and
greenhouse gases, net emissions are normally much lower than from fossil fuel combustion.
Current geothermal capacity is approximately 8,000 MW, generated in about twenty countries. An
additional 12,000 MW equivalent of direct, nonelectric geothermal energy is being used for space
heating and other purposes. Although the potential for application of geothermal energy to power
generation is substantial, geothermal reservoirs of sufficient size and temperature for sustained
production of electricity are localized and often not conveniently located. Future development could
add an additional 10,000–15,000 MW in the United States and 50,000–100,000 MW worldwide.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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Advanced Nuclear
Advanced nuclear power plants are being deployed in Japan, France, Russia, China, India, and many
other countries. As a group, these new plants are designed to higher safety standards than previous
generation systems. But even with these improvements, nuclear energy suffers from the public
perception that the plants are inherently unsafe. Additionally, the problem of long-term storage of
nuclear waste has not been resolved. Nuclear capacity is currently growing in niches around the world
where national concerns over security of energy supplies outweigh the perceived risks. China, Japan,
India, and other countries are expected to add a net 48,000 MW of nuclear generating capacity. In
these countries, the economies of plant development are aided by quick construction times of three to
four years, in contrast to the twelve to fourteen years required for the last few nuclear power plants
built in the United States.
Innovative Technologies
Terrestrial Photovoltaics (PVs)
The price of photovoltaics has decreased substantially over the past two decades and is likely to be
competitive with conventional power sources for peak power and as a baseload power supplier well
before the reference period for our study. Cost per installed kilowatt is expected to be around $2,600
by 2020, compared with $3,200/kW installed in 1998.
These price decreases have widened the market for photovoltaics, leading to broad appeal in
supplementing the conventional power grid as either peaking capacity or baseload power. However,
using photovoltaics to supply baseload power requires an energy storage option, or backup power
source, to provide power twenty-four hours a day. Energy storage systems add a level of complexity
and cost that make it very difficult for terrestrial PVs to compete with other power-generation
technologies. Potential storage options considered include batteries and superconducting magnetic
energy storage (SMES).
Advanced zinc bromine batteries, expected to have a two- to five-hour storage capability, are
expected to be available during the reference period. These systems would be modular and scalable.
Expected capital costs for these batteries are $350/kW installed.
SMES operates by circulating direct current electricity in a superconducting magnetic coil. SMES
systems have no emissions and a high ramp rate and dispatch efficiency. They can supply spinning
reserve capacity and peak shaving capacity. In addition, large-scale systems are possible, and
advanced systems are likely to be available during the reference period.
However, SMES systems also are expensive. Installed costs on the order of $700/kW (in 1992
dollars) for two hours of storage are expected to be typical of these systems in the reference time
frame. SMES plants also incur siting limitations and operational issues caused by the high magnetic
fields generated, which may limit where these systems can be used.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
29
Wind Power
Wind power has made huge technical improvements and is already competitive with conventional
power plants in areas with the requisite wind speed. Wind power systems are modular and can be
constructed rather quickly.
Wind power systems suffer from the same limitation that plagues terrestrial photovoltaics in that
when used as a baseload power system, an energy storage option or a backup source of power is
necessary. As in the case of terrestrial photovoltaics, the cost of energy storage must be factored into
the price of electricity. In addition, wind power also suffers from resource availability and
accessibility of good wind power sites to transmission facilities. Expected costs of installation per
kilowatt are expected to range between $670 and $1,235 during the reference period, without energy
storage.
Fuel Cells
Fuel cells convert chemical energy directly into electricity without requiring combustion, producing
very low emissions levels. They operate on hydrogen derived from natural gas, liquid fuels such as
gasoline or methanol, or solids such as coal and biomass. Fuel cells are inherently modular, relatively
compact for their power output, and highly efficient.
Currently, four major kinds of fuel cells are under development: proton exchange membrane,
phosphoric acid, molten carbonate, and solid oxide. All will be available during the reference time
period. If current trends hold, fuel cells will make major inroads into the power generation sector by
the second quarter of the next century and capture a significant share of the transportation sector. The
combination of modularity, easy installation, high efficiency, and very low emissions as well the
ability to use gases from multiple sources should make the fuel cell part of any future power grid,
while offering consumers the option of going off grid. Expected costs of installation per kilowatt are
expected to range between $1,400 and $3,800 during the reference period.
Potential Future Ranges of Levelized Cost of Electricity
Table A-1 summarizes the range of our cost assessment of these technologies. The full table, with an
explanation of assumptions, is available from the authors.






















Low 1.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.6 3.2 5.9 9.1 3.9
High 5.5 7.2 10.2 6.0 10.0 16.6 54.5 41.9 17.4
Current 2.9 4.3 4.1 4.2 5.5 9.6 35.9 52.6 9.7
IGCC = Integrated gasification combined cycle; PVs = photovoltaics.Resources for the Future Macauley and others
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